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When the United States and its leading Western European allies decided at the end of
the 1940s to limit exports of strategic raw materials, products, and technology to
communist countries, this policy came into conflict with the desire of many non-
communist European countries not to take part in the East-West conflict. Many of
these nations were also eager to trade with Eastern Europe. In this chapter, we explore
the role of neutral countries in the context of Western embargo. Such an exercise was
last completed in 1968, although many scholars have since looked at individual
countries. We seek answers to a few interrelated key questions: How did the Western
alliance, and in particular the United States, try to incorporate Austria, Switzerland,
Sweden, Finland, and Ireland within the Western alliance’s export control system,
usually known as the CoCom?1 How did these neutral countries respond? How
successful were the Americans and their allies in their efforts?
According to Harto Hakovirta, “the most reliable indicators of a political actor’s
real policies, or at least its freedom of action, are the choices it makes in dilemmatic
test conditions and situations.”2 The establishment of CoCom created this kind of
dilemma to the neutrals, but whether or not they were incorporated within the
embargo is also significant for wider European history. Michael Mastanduno, one of
the leading authorities on the history of CoCom, has stated that “export control
policies and their coordination in CoCom have been an integral part of the postwar
international system.”3
As Bengt Sundelius highlighted, there are two ways of studying European
neutrality: one can do so in an idiosyncratic fashion by studying and emphasizing the
specific characteristics of individual countries or one can treat the neutral countries as
a group, and try to establish general patterns and structures among them.4 The
idiosyncratic approach has been considerably more popular among the students of
neutrality,5 and certainly there were differences between the neutral countries. The
Swiss and Swedish foreign policies were based on long traditions of neutrality.
Austria declared itself neutral in 1955, when the independent Austrian state was re-
established after a long period of occupation by US, British, French, and Soviet
troops. In the Finnish case, the closeness of the Soviet Union and the latter’s influence
on Finnish affairs forced the small country to refrain from actions that the Soviets
might find objectionable. Ireland, in turn, was located far from the frontlines of the
Cold War and was eager to emphasize its independence vis-à-vis the United
Kingdom.6
In this chapter, I will adopt the second approach, because I am arguing that, in the
context of the Western export control policies, similarities were more important than
the differences. In all cases, the US government feared that the neutrals could
undermine Western policies by exporting or re-exporting strategic goods to the
Eastern bloc, and hence the Americans pressured these countries to limit trade with
communist countries. The neutrals, with the partial exception of Ireland,7 tried to
defend their right not to participate in the Western economic embargo against the
communist bloc, but all eventually gave up.
It has to be underlined that the neutral countries did not act as a group in the same
way that the NATO or Eastern bloc members often did.8 In this article, “the neutrals”
is used as conceptual category to describe countries that, in public, did their best to
underline that they did not belong to either of the two alliances (US-led NATO and
the Soviet-led Eastern bloc).
The only scholar who has looked at the role of all non-communist neutral
European countries together in the context of Western embargo was Gunnar Adler-
Karlsson. In 1968, he published the first comprehensive book on the CoCom, in
which he also discussed the role of the neutrals.9 Adler-Karlsson did not have access
to confidential government documents, and often had little information on what was
going on behind the scenes.10 Since the late 1980s, many scholars have been able to
access previously closed collections. Therefore, this chapter is able to draw on a
number of significant works that have looked at individual countries or groups of
countries. These include Birgit Karlsson’s and Mikael Nilsson’s works on Sweden,11
André Schaller’s and Klaus Ammann’s on Switzerland,12 Till Geiger’s on Ireland,13
Niklas Jensen-Eriksen’s on Finland,14 and Hendrik Roodbeen’s Ph.D. thesis, which
looks at a number of small allied or neutral countries, including Switzerland and
Austria.15 In addition, information for this chapter has been collected from US,
British, Swedish, and Finnish archives, as well as from the archives of CoCom, which
are located in Paris, France.
Compromising neutrality
During the Cold War decades, the European states were commonly divided into three
groups. First, there were those that had joined the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO) and hence had established a close political and military alliance with the US.
Second, there were countries that formed what outsiders often called the “Eastern” or
“Soviet” bloc and, since 1955, were members of the Warsaw Pact. Third, there were
countries that had joined neither of these two competing alliances, and had professed
their willingness to stay neutral in the Cold War, which could at any time escalate into
a World War III.
Some contemporary observers were not impressed by the statements made by the
leaders of these countries. For example, Harto Hakovirta argued in 1988, in what
became a classic study on this subject, that “European neutrality has suffered from an
inherent and chronic problem of credibility since the emergence of the East-West
conflict.”16 He and some other scholars pointed out that, in ideological terms,
Switzerland, Austria, Sweden, Finland, and Ireland were not uncommitted but a part
of the Western world.17 Their political and economic systems were based on Western
ideas of democracy and capitalism. Furthermore, their trading patterns revealed that
they were economically more dependent on the West than the East. Most later joined
Western European regional organizations like the Organisation for European
Economic Co-operation (OEEC) and the European Free Trade Association (EFTA).18
During the 1970s and the 1980s, the links between neutrals and the United States
did, however, become somewhat weaker when many Europeans criticized strongly
US participation in the Vietnam War and, later, President Ronald Reagan’s foreign
policies.19 Neutral powers could then represent themselves as supporters of world
peace and the joint interests of world community in a divided planet. In short, they
occasionally implied that they were in some ways morally superior to the NATO and
Warsaw Pact countries.20 Neutrality could also become a part of national identity or
self-image, even if it had originally been adopted for pragmatic reasons.21
Supporting neutral tendencies in non-communist countries benefited the Soviets if
such neutrality weakened the Western alliance.22 The Soviets nevertheless continued
to harbor suspicions about the policies of the countries that had actually chosen a
neutral path. “In general, it is obvious that the credibility of wartime neutrality by the
Western European neutrals is fairly low in Soviet eyes,” Hakovirta wrote in 1987.23
Since then, a substantial amount of previously closed archival sources has become
available for research, and from these sources we have learned that the Soviet
suspicions were well founded. Sweden provides a case in point. As Mikael Nilsson
summarized,
Between 1945 and 1952 the Swedish government tried to combine US demands
for solidarity with the West with a credible policy of neutrality. The end result
was Swedish consent to American hegemony in Western Europe. Sweden
participated in the Marshall Plan, agreed secretly to abide by the CoCom trade
embargo, and embarked on an extensive, secret, military cooperation with the
US and Britain.24
In short, Sweden became “a trusted ally.”25 Another scholar, Simon Moores, has
written, that Swedish weapons were pointing East.26 The same was true in the Swiss
case,27 and Oliver Rathkolb found evidence that Austria tended to behave like a
“secret ally” of the West, although the country also tried to form links with the Soviet
Union.28 Even Finns, who were often believed to be under the thumb of the Soviets,
formed secret links with the West during the early Cold War period. The Finnish
Security Policy (Suojelupoliisi) identified Finnish communists and the Soviet KGB as
its main opponents, and cooperated with US and British intelligence agencies in order
to contain the communist threat.29 Norwegian intelligence sent Finnish war veterans
to the Soviet Union to gather information about the Red Army, while the Americans
got photos and information from Finnish officials and soldiers. These links formed the
basis for a more extensive exchange of intelligence.30 When the British and US
officials spread propaganda to Finland, they found locals eager to help them.31
Need to secure “parallel action”
The Americans and, to a lesser degree, their allies believed that it was in the interest
of the West to stop the flow of sophisticated new technologies, as well as valuable
strategic items like weapons, machine tools, and important raw materials, to the
communist countries. The embargo would reduce the growth of the Eastern bloc’s
military potential, and hence it was a “necessary adjunct to the build-up of the North
Atlantic Treaty Organisation,”32 as The Economist wrote in 1954. The United States
introduced strict controls on its trade with the communist countries in 1948, and in
meetings held in Paris in November 1949 and January 1950, the Americans and the
European members of NATO (except Iceland) set up a joint export control
organization. The system was originally secret and had no official name. Two
committees were set up to coordinate the activities of member countries: the
Consultative Group and the Coordinating Committee (CoCom). As the first gradually
lost its significance, the system as a whole became known simply as the CoCom.
It was understandable that Austria, which was still partly occupied by Soviet
troops, and Finland, which was now living under the Soviet shadow, did not join
CoCom when the association was set up in 1949–1950. Ireland was only involved in
East-West trade to a very limited degree. It was therefore no surprise that these
countries were not present at the creation of the multilateral Western export control
system.
The Swiss and Swedes were free to join CoCom but refused to do so. International
law placed no restrictions on neutrals’ foreign trade, particularly in the case of the
Cold War, which was not a war at all in the formal sense.33 These legal points were
probably not going to impress most foreigners, and both the Swedes and the Swiss
argued that membership would be incompatible with their non-aligned and neutrality
policies. The latter warned as early as 1949 that “public knowledge [of US-Swiss
discussions] would force Swiss government to deny flatly any intention [of]
cooperating.”34
CoCom countries recognized that Sweden and Switzerland could effectively
undercut the Western export control system. Both had managed to stay out of World
War II, were important exporters of industrial goods, and could manufacture many
items that the members of the Western alliance were no longer willing to sell to the
East. Hence, the CoCom members gave considerable thought to how the neutrals
could be persuaded to adopt export controls against the socialist countries.35 There
was an “urgent need” to ensure that the Swiss and Swedes would introduce “parallel”
controls on East-West trade.36 The representatives of small neutral governments
sometimes ridiculed claims that their exports could have substantial impact on the
large Soviet economy,37 but the CoCom’s concern was in fact understandable. As
Klaus Knorr, a well-known student of international political economy, stated, “Once
there are holes in the embargo, futility is a foregone conclusion.”38 The socialist
countries knew this well. The Czechoslovakian authorities made considerable efforts
during the early 1950s to import via Switzerland and Sweden goods that the socialist
countries were no longer allowed to buy directly from CoCom countries.39 In the late
1950s and early 1960s, US officials complained that goods sent to Sweden were
redirected to Eastern bloc destinations and approached many Swedish companies to
stop them from selling embargoed US electronics to the East.40
Sales made by neutral countries could undermine export control policies, but they
could also jeopardize the cohesiveness and effectiveness of the Western alliance.
European CoCom members were therefore unwilling to include in the export control
lists items that the communist countries could buy from alternative suppliers. The US
officials recognized that if neutral countries could export strategic items freely to the
Soviet Union, it would be hard to ensure that European CoCom countries maintained
strict controls on their exports to the communist bloc.41
Neutral countries depended on American technology and raw materials, and the
United States government could use this dependence as a tool to persuade neutrals to
participate unofficially in Western export control policies. In October 1950, the
Swedes agreed to prevent re-exports of Western strategic goods to the Soviet Union.
They also stated that Swedish-made “war materials” were only exported to
“traditional” destinations, none of which were located behind the Iron Curtain.
The Americans, however, wanted more: the US government decided to put
pressure on the Swedes by limiting and delaying the sales of strategic materials to
them. The Swedes gave in, and in June 1951, Walton Butterworth, the US
Ambassador to Stockholm, and Dag Hammarskjöld, a State Secretary of the Swedish
Cabinet, concluded an unofficial agreement. The Swedes gave general assurances that
strategic goods from the US would not be re-exported to East and that sales of
Swedish strategic goods to socialist countries would be avoided if possible. The ball
bearing maker SKF, which had been a target of direct US pressure, went even further
than its competitors in the CoCom counties in its efforts to limit trade with the
socialist countries.42 These concessions were not meaningless: export control issues
became, according to Wilhelm Agrell, “a central component” of bilateral US-Swedish
relations,43 while Charles Silva concluded that export control cooperation “became a
benchmark for how Sweden could be incorporated into a key area of strategic
policy.”44
For Switzerland, trade with the socialist countries was of limited importance in
economic terms.45 However, by trading with them, the Swiss could demonstrate their
impartial attitude to the Cold War and their willingness to treat both sides equally.46
Following an approach from the CoCom countries, Switzerland nevertheless
introduced an effective system of import and re-export control and limited its exports
of strategic goods to Eastern Europe to “normal level” (courant normal). In practice,
this meant that they would not exceed the level of exports in 1949–1950. Therefore,
the Swiss agreed not to seize the opportunity to benefit from restrictions imposed by
CoCom countries. The British and French governments regarded the Swiss measures
as satisfactory, but the US did not. In order to put pressure on the small country, it
blocked a large number of Swiss attempts to buy essential goods from the US. The
“Americans’ high-handed tactics,” as the British diplomats called them, worked. The
Swiss invited a US delegation to Bern and, following intensive negotiations, a
compromise was reached in July. In this Hotz-Linder agreement, an oral “gentlemen’s
agreement,” the Swiss agreed to limit further their exports of many strategic goods to
an “essential” (courant essentiel) level. The Americans could accept this, even if the
restrictions were not quite as tight as the ones introduced previously by the CoCom
countries.47 Switzerland thereby “became a secret member of NATO’s economic
warfare system.”48
Both the Swedes and Swiss were now partly integrated within the Western export
control system, although they could conveniently argue that they still had
“autonomous” policies (albeit policies that satisfied CoCom’s wishes);49 the latter
later claimed that, actually, their neutrality applied only to political and military
spheres.50
Finland and Austria
Austria and Finland were more difficult cases for Western export control authorities
than Sweden or Switzerland. The Swiss and Swedes could, if they were willing to
compromise their neutrality, cooperate with the Western alliance, but the Finns and
Austrians had less freedom. Up to 1955, Austria was occupied by both Western and
Soviet troops, and the latter could undermine the effectiveness of Austrian export
control mechanisms.51 Finland was a neighbor of the Soviet Union and, although it
had managed to avoid Soviet occupation during World War II, the Soviets might try
again or help Finnish communists to arrange a coup. The Finns also had to ship large
war reparations deliveries to the Soviet Union between 1944 and 1952, which formed
the basis of extensive commercial trade between the two countries.
On the other hand, strict export control policies toward Finland and Austria could
harm their economies, help communists attract more support from local populations,
and push these countries closer to the Eastern bloc. A British official therefore
concluded that “we should be reluctant to deny to Austria many of the prohibited
items as to do so would be contrary to our general policy of building up her economic
strength.”52 In addition, the British were eager, for commercial reasons, to protect
what was a traditionally extensive Anglo-Finnish trade.53
Finland and Austria became targets of the British and the US, and later also of
CoCom’s export control policies, but the Western regulations concerning them were
considerably more relaxed than those concerning trade with the communist countries.
The two countries were allowed to buy goods they needed for normal peacetime use,
but shipments were tightly scrutinized in order to stop diversion to communist hands.
Sales of munitions were mostly prohibited. The CoCom countries underlined their
sympathetic attitudes towards Finland and Austria, but because of Finland’s
“unfortunate geographical and economic position” and the Soviets’ occupation of part
of Austria, restrictions were deemed necessary.54
CoCom countries submitted regular reports of their strategic exports to these
countries to the secretariat of the organization.55 Communist Yugoslavia, which in
1948 broke away from the Soviet bloc, was treated in the same way as Austria and
Finland. In 1951, the leading Western nations of the US, UK, and France mostly
eliminated their restrictions of trade with Yugoslavia, because they had adopted a
policy of supporting the country against the increasing Soviet military threat.56
CoCom’s reporting requirements were also abolished in regards to the Balkan
country.57
Finland and Austria were targets of export control policies, but also cooperated
with Western authorities. As early as 1948, US and Austrian authorities jointly set up
a system to prevent the sales of strategic goods to communist countries.58 The Finns
concluded neither official nor unofficial agreements with the Americans. Gunnar
Adler-Karlsson believed, erroneously, that the Finnish-Soviet “special relationship …
made any cooperation with the CoCom policy unthinkable.”59 The US and Finnish
documents indicate, however, that the US diplomats who administered export controls
formed close relations with key Finnish officials and industrialists and, as a result of
these links, the Americans gradually began to trust that the Finns were not re-
exporting confidential Western goods or technology to the Eastern bloc.60 The
Americans reported to the CoCom in early 1950 that they had found “no evidence of
diversions” of US strategic goods that had been sold to Finland.61 In a CoCom
meeting in June 1952, the Danes summarized that the Finns and Austrians were both
“co-operating in the Committee’s controls.”62
There were clear similarities between US cooperation with the Austrians on the
one hand and with the Finns on the other hand. Export control was based on informal
methods.63 Both in Helsinki and in Vienna, there was an American Screening
Committee that monitored US shipments to the country in question.64 In both
countries, a number of officials cooperated unofficially and secretly with the US and
British officials who were responsible for the embargo.65 For example, in February
1956, the chairman of a Whitehall committee responsible for security controls stated
that “during the Occupation we had received a good deal of informal co-operation
from the Austrians in preventing the supply of strategic goods to the Soviet zone and
the Bloc.”66 There was, however, one crucial difference between the small countries:
in December 1955, the Austrian government lost its ability to monitor carefully its
imports and exports when the country’s trade was liberalized.67 In the case of Finland,
however, similar liberalization never applied to Finnish-Soviet trade.
The Americans were also concerned about the exports of Finnish-made strategic
goods, such as tankers and copper, to the Soviet Union. The Finns cooperated with the
Western export control authorities in order to prevent the re-export of Western
strategic goods to the Soviet bloc but refused to halt the sales of Finnish-made
strategic goods. Many of the items that the Finns sold to the Soviet Union were,
however, removed from the CoCom embargo lists in 1954 and 1958; hence, at the end
of the 1950s, the Finnish exports no longer undermined the Western embargo in a
substantial way.68
Why cooperate?
Why did the neutrals cooperate with the Americans? The simple answer was that they
had to, because otherwise the Americans would retaliate. If Europeans rejected the
US’s demands, the latter could refuse to sell them strategic materials or to give them
economic aid.69 Yet, this reason is not sufficient to explain all the cooperation,
because it does not take into account the fact that many neutrals did see the Soviet
Union and communism as threatening forces. For example, E. A. W. Bullock, of the
British Foreign Office, recognized that the Swiss were of course determined to protect
their trading relations with the West, but he suspected that they were also “genuinely
anxious not to help the Russians.”70 Research by Till Geiger suggests that, by limiting
exports to the Eastern bloc, Irish politicians could demonstrate their anti-Communist
credentials in a cost-effective way.71
Something similar happened in Finland. The Finns needed US and Western
European supplies and technologies and were not willing to endanger their essential
trading links with these countries, but Finnish companies had another motive to
cooperate with Western powers, as well. The owners and managers of Finnish
companies were usually strongly anti-communist. The companies, including many of
those that traded extensively with the Soviets, funded anti-communist struggle in
Finnish political life, and tried to strengthen Finnish economic and cultural links with
the Western world. During the Cold War, they worked hard to project an image of
Finland as a democratic market economy to the Western world.72 By cooperating with
the US and British export control administrations, Finnish industrialists could not only
make sure that they received goods and technology, but they also were able to show
that they regarded themselves as a part of the Western world, even though Finland
could not join the Western alliance. Policymakers in Washington were eager to
receive such pro-Western and anti-communist messages. Niklas Stenlås and Mikael
Nilsson have suggested that the Western embargo policy could be seen as “a
touchstone which could be used to probe the alignment of hesitant or refractory
countries such as Sweden and Switzerland.”73
The Irish did not have to pay high price for their strict attitude on East-West trade,
because the country’s trade with socialist countries was already very limited.74
Finnish trade with the communist countries was, in contrast, extensive, as the latter
bought a quarter or a fifth of Finland’s exports during the early part of the Cold War.
The trade was not only extensive, but also particularly profitable for Finnish
companies.75 Nevertheless, the Finns often had an economic motive to comply with
the Western re-export regulations. They had to ensure that the goods sold to the
Soviet Union by Finland did not contain too many Western components. Finland had
to pay for these components with hard currencies but itself received payment from the
Soviet Union in inconvertible clearing rubles. Extensive use of Western items would
therefore cause balance of payments problems for Finland.76
Disadvantages and advantages of neutrality
The Western alliance had introduced the embargo in order to minimize the Soviet
threat to their security. The neutral countries mostly saw the issue differently. At least
to some of them, the strategic embargo was not an East-West problem, but rather a
West-West problem.77 In other words, the threat that provoked the neutral countries to
limit their exports of strategic goods did not always come from Soviet Union, but
sometimes from the West – in particular, from the US.78 The neutral countries were
concerned that the US and its allies would use economic sanctions against them or
force them to adopt policies that undermined their efforts to stay out of the global
confrontation between the Western and Eastern alliances.
Although the Americans were eager to stop the flow of strategic materials to the
East, they were not trying to force neutral countries to become full members in the
Western embargo. As Birgit Karlsson concluded, for “the USA the contents of policy
were more important than the form it was given in, while for Sweden the opposite was
the case.”79 The informality of the arrangements between the US and the neutrals gave
the latter a chance to claim that they had not diverted from the policy of neutrality,
while in practice they had done just that. Swedish companies were instructed to refuse
to sell items on CoCom lists to the communist countries unless the Swedish
government approved these deals. If the order was rejected, the companies were told
not to disclose the real reason to their potential customers, but instead claim that they
lacked necessary production capacity or raw materials.80
Informal cooperation with the Americans had some disadvantages. As neutral
countries were not formally members of CoCom, they had to continuously prove that
they could be trusted. As a result, they could even become “more Catholic than the
Pope,” as the Polish concluded when they failed to buy ball bearings from Sweden but
got them from NATO countries instead.81 CoCom members often defended their
interests against US demands. One such country was Denmark. According to
Karlsson, the “Danish example seems to imply that it was possible to combine formal
adherence to CoCom with a relatively independent trade policy, whereas Swedish
formal independence was combined with extensive concessions in practice.”82
Furthermore, since each neutral country negotiated independently with the US
government, they could not get support from other neutrals that were facing similar
pressure. In contrast, small CoCom countries could join forces with each other in
order to block US initiatives that they opposed.83 The Swiss and Swedes consulted
each other,84 but the neutrals did not form a wider bloc, even though such extensive
cooperation could have strengthened their bargaining position vis-à-vis the US. The
Swedes even sent reports to the CoCom of their exports of strategic goods to
Finland.85 Building a “third bloc” was probably an alien idea to countries underlining
their neutrality or non-aligned status, but such a cooperation could have brought
benefits. Thomas Fischer has studied the role of “N+N states” in the process that led
to the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe in 1975. In this case, the
ability of neutral and non-aligned countries, for the first time, to build a “third force”
helped to change their position “from objects to subjects in European Cold War
affairs.”86
There was, however, some Nordic cooperation in the field of export controls. The
Danes and Norwegians were members of CoCom and supplied information about its
internal discussions to the Swedes.87 In 1951, the Danes resisted attempts to put
pressure on Sweden and Switzerland.88 The Norwegians and Danes also jointly
opposed restrictions on Western trade with Finland,89 and later tried to have the
reporting requirements concerning Finland abolished.90
Politically, the neutrals had “sinned.” But did this matter economically? A group of
scholars have argued that they nevertheless become “path-breakers in building East-
West contacts.”91 During the Korean War (1950–1953), when relations between the
Western and Eastern blocs were tense, the neutrals sold roughly half of all goods
exported by non-communist countries to socialist countries in Europe. At the end of
the decade, the market share of the neutrals was still close to 40 percent. These figures
reflect, to a large degree, an overall decline in East-West trade, but they nevertheless
indicate that the neutrals could protect their trade interests in the socialist countries
better than the CoCom countries. How was this possible? There are two key reasons.
First, as the neutral countries were not full members, their export restrictions were
more relaxed than those of full CoCom members. Second, communist countries
seemed to feel that small neutral countries were, to some degree, less dangerous
trading partners than other capitalist states.92
However, we have to recognize that neutrality itself did not automatically make a
country an intermediary in the Cold War: the Swiss had relatively little interest in
trade with the socialist countries, and the Irish even less. The Swiss could show that
the Hotz-Linder agreement had only a small impact on the country’s foreign trade,
except in the case of machine exports, which suffered. A fear of US countermeasures,
but also the increasingly complicated Soviet foreign trade bureaucracy, the
communists’ striving for autarky, and lack of interest in Eastern European products
encouraged Swiss traders to divert their business to non-communist countries. Swiss
trade with the Soviet Union had been declining since 1949 and, in 1952, essential
quotas were filled only partly. In September 1954, following relaxation of the general
CoCom embargo, the Swiss Federal Council terminated the Hotz-Linder agreement,
but continued to restrict trade – too strictly, according to the Soviets.93 Austria,
however, had a strong interest in trading with other parts of the former Habsburg
Empire, while the large war reparations shipments formed the basis of Finnish-Soviet
trade, which was also seen as a symbol of new postwar “friendship” between the two
countries.
Conclusions
If the establishment of CoCom is analyzed as “a test” for European neutrals, it is clear
that they failed it. In the 1950s, each of these countries cooperated with the Western
alliance in the latter’s efforts to limit strategic exports from non-communist countries
to the Soviet bloc. Some of the officials and companies of the neutral countries shared
the desire of CoCom to limit the flow of military useful goods to the East, while
others tried to maintain the appearance of neutrality even though there was a lot of
practical cooperation between CoCom and uncommitted countries. This cooperation
was often based on informal links and agreements, which shows how important it is to
look at low-level interaction instead of focusing on “high politics” and public
statements.
In his recent study on Finnish security police (Suojelupoliisi), Kimmo Rentola
concluded that there was little room for neutrality in Cold War intelligence
activities.94 The same could be said about the field of export controls. If neutral
countries continued to sell communist countries items embargoed by the Western
alliance, this trade helped the Soviet Union and its allies to undermine the embargo.
If, on the other hand, the neutrals stopped this trade, they participated in the efforts of
the Western alliance to weaken the military and economic potential of the communist
countries. We know now that, in most cases, the neutrals chose the latter option
regardless of whether it was compatible with the declared guidelines of their
neutrality policy.
All neutrals, including the ones located closest to the Soviet bloc, were living in
the “American century.”95 None of the countries – not even front-line ones like
Austria and Finland – could resist US demands for cooperation. Some of their
policymakers and industrialists did not even want to try. During previous conflicts,
neutral countries had often reaped economic benefits from their uncommitted status.
During the early Cold War, however, the US was economically strong enough to
limit, although not totally eliminate, such benefits.
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